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by motion under CPLR 3211 (a).3 9 Carlson v. Travelers Insurance Co.40
involves the consequences emanating from the failure to plead illegality
either by motion or in the answer.
In Carlson an action was brought to recover under a group accident and health policy for hospital expenses incurred by the insured
who had undergone and had died from an illegal abortion. The defendant failed to plead illegality as an affirmative defense. Nonetheless,
the court permitted the defendant to adduce proof of the proscribed
transaction, reasoning that the plaintiffs were well aware of the dece41
dent's act and there was thus little danger of prejudice.
The Carlson outcome is a well-reasoned one. There is, however, an
additional mode of attaining the same result. Under CPLR 3211(e),
a motion prescribed in paragraph seven of 8211(a) -failure to state
a cause of action- is never waived. Inasmuch as an allegation of
illegality as to the merits of a claim is tantamount to an assertion
42
that the pleader does not possess a legally cognizable cause of action,
one authority advocates the use of a 3211(a)(7) motion in instances
such as Carlson.43
ArTicLE 31
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CPLR 3102(d): Disclosure will not be permitted during trial where
the movant had an opportunity to obtain the information by normal
pretrial proceedings.
CPLR 8102(d) provides that "during and after trial, disclosure may
be obtained only by order of the tTial court on notice." In Schricker v.
City of New York44 the trial court permitted plaintiffs' expert witness,
an orthopedic specialist, to testify out of the presence of the jury because of his phobia of testifying before them. The court then allowed
plaintiffs to read the doctor's deposition to the jury. The appellate
division viewed this procedure as prejudicial error inasmuch as the
notice contemplated by CPLR 3102(d) was not given, and it did not
appear that the plaintiffs were previously unaware of the witness'
inability to testify before a jury.
39 7B McKINNEY"S CPLR 3018, supp. commentary at 171 (1970). Apparently, all of
the defenses except fraud can be safely pleaded under CPLR 3211(a). Because of the
intricate factual setting in which the allegation of fraud is likely to arise, it has been
posited that this defense is more appropriately considered at the trial. 7B MCK1NNEY'S

CPLR 3211, commentary 36, at 40 (1970).

40 35 App. Div. 2d 351, 316 N.Y.S.2d 398 (2d Dep't 1970).

3018.18.
41 See also 3 WK&M
427B McKiNNzy's CPLR 3211, commentary 29, at 33 (1970).

43 Id., commentary 36, at 40.
44 35 App. Div. 2d 743, 316 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2d Dep't 1970).
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

CPLR 3102(d) is reserved for unique situations. Although the
court, in its discretion, may order the taking of testimony by deposition
after the trial has begun, disclosure ordinarily will not be unavailable
to the movant who could have secured the information through normal
pretrial proceedings. 45 Hence, the appellate division was certainly
justified in over turning the procedure followed in the lower court.
The framers of the CPLR anticipated that extraordinary situations might exist wherein justice required the reading of a deposition
into evidence although a witness was available for the trial.46 Nonetheless, the importance of presenting the testimony of an expert witness
orally in court must not be underestimated. Slight inconsistencies in
treatises or inadequacies in medical records with respect to time of
treatment or nature of observations, which can appear so dramatic
in the course of the trial, become quite insignificant when a deposition is read in court. Perhaps, the courts should adopt a rule prohibiting the use of depositions of expert witnesses in circumstances such as
Schricker. An expert who is afraid to appear before a jury, and refuses
to do so, should not be permitted to serve as a witness because of the
unfairness to the opposing party.
CPLR 3126: Action dismissed with prejudice where preclusion order
encompasses entire claim.
47
CPLR 3126 authorizes the imposition of penalties upon a party
4
who refuses to disclose information either willfully or in disobedience
of a court order. In addition to the express sanctions, the court is empowered to make "any such orders that are just.''49 Undoubtedly,
however, the most severe penalty that can be levied is one that is specifically enumerated under this section: the rendition of a default
judgment against the recalcitrant defendant 0 or the dismissal with
45 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3102, commentary 8, at 267 (1970); 3 WK&M
3102.19; see
also Kravetz v. United Artists Corp., 141 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955). But cf.
Nardelli v. Stain, 13 App. Div. 2d 698, 213 N.Y.S.2d 806 (2d Dep't 1961); Lopez v. Rich, 33
Misc. 2d 102, 224 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
46 3 WK&M

3117.08.

47 CPLR 3126 pertains to a party or a person under the party's control. Sanctions
against a nonparty witness are secured by an application to punish for contempt. 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 3126, commentary 3, at 642 (1970).
48 If a party has willfully failed to disclose, a 3126 motion lies, without the necessity
of first securing an order compelling disclosure. See Goldner v. Lendor Structures, Inc.,
29 App. Div. 2d 978, 289 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1968); Coffey v. Orbachs, Inc., 22 App.
Div. 2d 317, 254 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1st Dep't 1964).
49 See, e.g., Cotteral v. City of New Rochelle, 33 App. Div. 2d 366, 807 N.Y.S.2d 725
(Ist Dep't 1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. Rix. 145, 159 (1970).

50 See, e.g., James v. Powell, 26 App. Div. 2d 525, 270 N.YS.2d 789 (1st Dep't 1966),

rev'd on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1967).

